Encyclopedia of Propaganda Techniques: Part 5
Creating an Information Wave
One of the most effective techniques for influencing large groups through propaganda is the creation (or initiation) of an “information wave.” This tactic is designed so that a large number of mass media outlets are compelled to comment on the initial message. The main goal is to generate a “secondary information wave” at the level of interpersonal communication—sparking discussions, evaluations, and rumors. (See also: Use of Mediators.) This greatly amplifies the psychological impact on target audiences.
The trigger (“incident”) for an information wave can be almost any event. In modern practice, we see many forms of this, including scandals. For celebrities, it might be loud announcements about leaving the stage, relationship rumors, or gossip about sexual orientation. Politicians often provoke conflicts with opponents through actions or statements designed to become noticeable events. A classic example is the image-building of LDPR leader V. Zhirinovsky (public brawls, throwing juice at opponents, etc.).
Another way to start an information wave is the simple “leak” of compromising material—when the media publishes “sensational” content discrediting a high-profile figure (e.g., videos of sex parties, audio of “bad” conversations, etc.). Events that shock the mass audience—acts of sacrilege, terrorism, political assassinations—are especially powerful in initiating information waves.
More often, however, it is not the content of the event but the technology of its dissemination that creates the information wave. No matter how sensational, information “burns out” in 6-7 days and fades from public consciousness. The “life” of an information wave can be extended through a specially constructed media distribution system—a technology long used by intelligence agencies.
How does this system work? Intelligence agencies maintain a “fifth column” abroad: paid journalists, public or political figures with influence. Establishing such contacts is a constant task for any intelligence residency. These contacts serve a dual purpose: journalists are excellent informants, and they can easily fabricate and place propaganda materials in local media. Sometimes, agencies prepare the materials themselves and pay journalists to publish them as their own work. These agents pass off propaganda as genuine “hot news” to agencies, major newspapers, or TV programs. Once published, other agents pick up the story, citing the original outlet, and spread it nationwide or globally.
The operation is designed to create a “snowball effect”—media outlets begin to generate stories on their own, without further involvement from the propagandists. Think of how an avalanche starts: a small stone rolls down, gathers more stones, and soon an unstoppable mass is moving. The same principle applies to information waves: journalists hungry for exclusives are given “exclusive information,” which they spread, borrow, and develop, often without the original propagandist’s involvement. This is a key method in special information operations. A critical mass of information (“the stone”) is created, and once it reaches a certain volume, it spreads on its own, reproducing itself in new stories. This creates a “primary” information wave, which then generates a “secondary” one.
Information waves are used to achieve several objectives. The ultimate goal may be destabilization—disrupting or paralyzing the activities of large population groups, organizations, or entire state institutions. Both external adversaries (foreign governments or intelligence agencies) and internal financial-political clans may be interested in destabilization. Another goal is activation—prompting individuals or groups to act in a desired way. For example, a political scandal can be escalated to the “boiling point,” leading to public protests or unrest. Finally, interdiction—preventing certain actions or blocking unwanted activities—can also be a goal.
A typical example of massive information waves is the campaign to create a negative image of specific countries. Former CIA officer Philip Agee noted that during the Allende government in Chile (early 1970s), American intelligence published thousands of slanderous and distorted materials both inside and outside the country. Today, before every US military-political action, a corresponding propaganda campaign is launched in the American and global press. Western intelligence agencies actively use major news agencies (Reuters, Associated Press, etc.) to push propaganda into influential newspapers, magazines, and TV shows. Russian agencies do the same—consider the “Georgian problem” in Russian media in 2001-2002 (Chechen militants, “Al-Qaeda” terrorists, or even Bin Laden allegedly hiding in Georgia; accusations against Georgian authorities; Russian airstrikes on Georgian territory, etc.). This is a typical example of initiating an information wave to pressure political regimes inconvenient for Russian authorities.
Often, the role of the “fifth column” is played by international NGOs, mainly Western organizations with a “human rights” image: Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and many others. When certain US or Western European circles need to achieve political goals abroad, these organizations receive specific orders and launch information attacks on the target. They act as diversionary squads, stirring public opinion both domestically and internationally—by inflating scandals about press freedom, human rights, minority rights, animal rights, and so on.
Creating a Problem
Propaganda does not always convince people of anything. Often, it cannot dictate how people should think. However, massive propaganda campaigns in the media can dictate what we should think about—imposing the “right” agenda for discussion. Creating a problem means selectively highlighting information and assigning high importance to certain events. An event and its media coverage are not the same: the media can “ignore” an event or, conversely, make it seem extremely important, regardless of its real significance.
In the 1980s, political psychologists Donald Kinder and Shanto Iyengar conducted a brilliant experiment. They altered the content of evening news programs watched by study participants. In one experiment, one group saw news about weaknesses in US defense; another group saw environmental issues; a third group heard about inflation and economic problems. After a week, most participants believed the highlighted problem was the most important issue facing the country. Moreover, when evaluating the president, participants focused on how he handled the highlighted problem. This new perception also influenced political preferences—candidates strong on the featured issue were rated more positively.
Another finding: information activity about an object can give it a status disproportionate to its real importance. Selective information can inflate or deflate its status. Thus, a “small dog” in real life can become an “elephant” in the media, and vice versa. For example, the Russian Communist Party, a strong political force, receives little media coverage. Another variant is deliberate distortion: for example, communist rallies are shown focusing on elderly participants or portraits of Stalin or Lenin. If a goat is brought to a rally, all cameras focus on it. Such coverage makes random features seem systemic, creating an inaccurate image.
Researchers constantly find a link between media coverage and what viewers see as the most important social problems. People consider the most covered issues to be the most pressing. By creating thematic dominance, the media imposes a certain worldview, shaping opinions on government actions, crime, terrorism, inequality, unemployment, etc. Sergei Kara-Murza writes: “The risk of dying in a terrorist attack is a thousand times less than dying in a car accident. About 1 in 1,000 Russian drivers die annually. (We won’t mention deaths from AIDS or alcoholism, or domestic violence.) About 1 in a million die from terrorism. Yet we aren’t afraid to drive, but we fear terrorists. Why? Because the powerful have no interest in making us fear cars. That’s why TV doesn’t show us mangled car crash victims all day. If it did, we’d be terrified of cars!”
Although some issues have not grown in real importance since the 1970s or 1980s, biased information policy has led most Russians to see the “threat of international terrorism” as the country’s biggest danger, rather than real social problems: declining birth rates, unemployment, rampant alcoholism, drug and AIDS pandemics, growing inequality, and radicalization. (For context: demographers say that at current rates of drug and AIDS spread, Russia’s GDP could drop 20% in 5-7 years due to loss of working-age population—only nuclear war could hit harder. Now, consider how much time Russian media spends on these problems versus Saddam Hussein and “international terrorist centers.”)
Jeffrey Pfeffer argues that one of the most important sources of power today is the ability to set the agenda—deciding which problems are discussed, which information is widely spread, and which is suppressed. For example, a “crackdown” policy is easily sold to the public by linking it to daily prime-time reports of murders and robberies. After regular coverage of terrorist acts, it’s easy to declare a “terrorist war” against the nation, calling for unity around a “savior of the homeland.”
Today, information has become a tool of power, and advances in propaganda technology make it a key element of social dominance. That’s why information is delivered to consumers in a processed form. By artificially creating “current problems,” the media imposes certain interpretations of social relations that benefit those in power. Public ignorance allows the media to exert hidden regulatory influence on people’s intellect, emotions, and will.
Creating a Threat
Another “strategic” technique targets the emotions of the mass audience. Its main goal is to make us afraid by any means. Demoralized and frightened people will do—or at least approve of—things that are not in their own interest. The usual method: an illusory or real danger (e.g., terrorism) is exaggerated to the point of absurdity. The media whips up hysteria about the latest “global threat,” creating mass fear to facilitate manipulation—primarily for political purposes, such as bringing a “tough” leader to power.
This technique has long been used in Western propaganda. In the past, the “Soviet threat” was the bogeyman—propaganda and pop culture depicted scary, bearded Russians with red stars on their hats, swigging vodka. Now, the role is filled by “Islamic terrorists” in turbans. Times and people change, but the “global threat” technique remains. It’s a powerful way to unite the public around the authorities. Terrified by the “enemy of civilization,” people cling to their leaders—”save us!” Under the cover of a new threat (be it Bin Laden, anti-globalists, or an asteroid), those in power can pursue their own agendas and distract from real political problems. The virtual world (e.g., war in Chechnya or Afghanistan) created by the media becomes more important to the public than unemployment or government corruption. This technique is closely related to the propaganda method of Distraction.
Creating a threat is also an effective way to channel public discontent toward “safe” or convenient targets—a process known in social psychology as “scapegoating.”
“Today, the bogeyman of the enemy is still a powerful tool for demagogues to create unity and a sense of belonging,” wrote Konrad Lorenz in “On Aggression.”
“Patriotism versus terrorism” became the most popular propaganda slogan in the US after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The fear and shock were used to implant the “enemy image” in the public mind. The targets of this new patriotism were not only the actual perpetrators but also any political regimes inconvenient for the US. Current “anti-terrorist operations” are often directed against regional movements opposing transnational corporations or US global dominance. If you reject the “land of opportunity” on the world stage, you risk being labeled a terrorist.
People are constantly pushed into a narrow perception, offered simple labels and formulas. For example, just say “the fight against terrorism,” and no further explanation is needed. The phrase “international terrorism” has become a universal argument, a kind of indulgence for any political action—whether it’s seizing oil fields, pacifying rebellious provinces, or eliminating political opponents—all under the banner of “fighting international terrorism.”
Creating a threat is often used during election campaigns—a cornerstone of modern political technology. Studies show that most voters don’t see any candidate as truly suitable. When forced to choose between the lesser of two evils, people tend to pick the less frightening option. Thus, the opponent must be made to seem worse and scarier. The main thing is to convince voters that if your opponent wins, life will get worse; if you win, at least things won’t get worse. As one German politician said, “Choosing an enemy is too important to leave to chance.” State structures have the best opportunities for this: by controlling the government and media, the “incumbent” can manipulate the electorate, not only making himself the favorite but also choosing the most convenient opponent.
In the post-Soviet space, people are often scared with the threat of a “communist comeback.” Right before elections, pro-government media highlight the “bad communists” by showing the negative sides of the past. On the eve of voting, TV airs films about Stalinist repressions, etc. The long-dead communist corpse is jolted with electricity (like a decapitated frog in a school lab) to make it twitch and seem alive. Meanwhile, real opponents are neutralized, and the scarecrow is presented as the main rival. If elections have several rounds, this is achieved by advancing the incumbent and a deliberately “unviable” pseudo-opposition candidate to the final round.
At the same time, “our candidate” (usually the incumbent) is presented as the best alternative, with positive presidential experience. News and commentary programs show him as an experienced manager and caring president. In short, “There is no alternative!”
In Western Europe, fear of the far right is used for the same purpose. A recent example: the 2002 French presidential election, where media-driven fear was used to undermine the socialists and advance far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen to the runoff. At the same time, the fact that Trotskyists (far-left extremists) received almost as many votes as the far right and socialists was ignored, as was the violence that followed Le Pen’s success. The real problem of extremism was not properly analyzed, showing the operation’s deliberate nature. The result: Jacques Chirac won a landslide, with most voters holding their noses. The “threat creation” technique is extremely effective.
The threat creation technique is also widely used in commercial advertising. Today’s ads skillfully exploit our fears and psychological complexes—often the very ones they create: “Use super-effective toothpaste, or your teeth will rot!”
Social Approval
“And now—a commercial break!” This familiar phrase is always accompanied by audience applause and cheers in TV studios. Why? TV executives know the results of social psychology research: loud applause and cheers serve as social approval, signaling, “Everyone agrees with this message, and you should too!” This is a way to “turn off” psychological defenses against advertising, minimizing irritation at having your favorite show interrupted by dumb or primitive commercials.
Social approval is one of the psychological autopilots nature has given us. We decide what is good and right by observing what others think is good and right. The actions of those around us shape our opinions and behavior. When many people do the same thing, we assume they know something we don’t—so we join in to avoid being left out. Herd mentality takes over, and that’s the psychological trap.
This technique has long been used by sellers of miracle cures and healers, who planted shills in the audience to praise the product. Politicians use “support groups” at rallies to cheer and applaud. TV producers add canned laughter and applause to shows (which makes viewers laugh more, even at bad jokes). Advertisers hire actors to play ordinary people praising a product, or show products as highly sought after (e.g., commercials where housewives fight over the last box of detergent). Even in comedy shows and holiday specials, studio guests laugh and applaud on cue for the camera, and their reactions are edited in.
These situations are meant to create the impression that most people act the way you are being encouraged to act. The open nature of this manipulation is striking—organizers don’t even try to hide it. The psychological automatism of social approval is so strong that it works even when we know it’s fake. Psychologist Roger Fuller found that canned laughter makes most people laugh even when they know it’s artificial.
A variant of social approval is “rating”—publishing pseudo-sociological polls to convince us that a certain politician or party is loved by the majority and will win.
The opposite of social approval is social disapproval—a propaganda technique to create the illusion that certain actions are condemned by public opinion. This is done by selecting negative statements from “opinion leaders,” representatives of various social groups, “ordinary people,” or by citing poll data.
Fused Sentences
The “fused sentences” method is designed to bypass critical perception of propaganda messages. It creates a single semantic chain from several unrelated pieces of information. Each piece is true on its own, but their combination gives a distorted impression of the event. This is another example of pseudo-logical cause-and-effect, enhanced by “factual propaganda.”
Example: A CNN report during the Yugoslav war (early 1990s): “For the second day, there has been shooting between Serbs and Albanians. According to some reports, the Serbs have heavy mortars. One shell hit a children’s hospital. Two children died.” All this is presented as a single message. The natural conclusion: the Serbs shelled the hospital and killed the children. Days later, it turns out the Serbs had no mortars, the shell came from Muslim positions, and the children died from sniper fire from Croatian territory. But it’s too late—the propaganda “duck” has already flown.
Many advertising and campaign slogans use fused sentences, often with an added directive: “Now you are looking into our eyes, so you can vote for us” (campaign ad). “You can be a winner in life. Your skin deserves reliable care” (men’s cologne ad). Two unrelated events are combined and perceived as a cause-and-effect sequence.