A Systematic Approach to Working with Beliefs
Within the NLP community, there is little doubt today that working with beliefs is one of the key and most fascinating areas in the development of NLP. John Grinder and Richard Bandler only briefly touched on the topic of working with beliefs and values. The authors themselves do not specify which logical level their techniques for working with beliefs, meaning reframing, and context reframing belong to, as they generally prefer not to use the logical levels paradigm and, therefore, do not define beliefs, values, and value criteria as a special level of work. However, any descriptive system that claims a certain degree of accuracy and integrity must define the terms and concepts it operates with.
Robert Dilts has done tremendous work in this direction. His pyramid of logical levels made it possible to create a hierarchical and more precise system for describing experience. We gained the ability to approach the assessment of situations and the selection of intervention methods at each logical level in a differentiated way. This allows for the development of specific areas of work in a more structured and high-quality manner. For example, Dilts singles out an entire area of working with beliefs as an independent field. Separate works on working with values have appeared, as well as major works such as “The Mission of NLP,” and so on.
However, one rather strange thing remains: no one has clearly defined what beliefs, values, value criteria, or mission actually are. Of course, such definitions exist, but they often differ even within the works of a single author. This creates significant confusion both in terminology and in methods of working. This statement may seem debatable, but try picking up any book by Robert Dilts and answering the following questions: What is the precise difference between beliefs and convictions? Between values and value criteria? Between value criteria and criteria? Or do you think you can answer such questions intuitively? If so, then it would seem we could do without the meta-model, since everything is already clear from the words themselves.
A precise, criteria-based language is one of the fundamental advantages of NLP over other descriptive systems. Every concept introduced into the system was justified precisely and by clear criteria. But with beliefs, things have been different. Even Dilts’ most developed approach has certain difficulties—different definitions lead to obvious inaccuracies in practice. He proposed 14 ways to work with beliefs. Outwardly, they look impressive, but these methods lack a structure that explains how they were formed. It’s hard to explain why there are 14, not 16 or 25. The “unpacking” does not include the principle of forming the structure itself. And without precise definitions of concepts, criteria, and beliefs, we are forced to memorize these methods and apply them to beliefs that are considered “limiting.” From whose perspective? A favorite question in NLP. There are many definitions that are more like “artistic whistling”—they lack criteria-based descriptions. Modern specialists mostly try to look at Dilts’ patterns from a different angle, hoping to get something new. The vast majority of authors use definitions from Ozhegov’s dictionary: “Belief is faith in something,” “Faith is a firm belief”—or do not define what they are working with at all.
Our Approach: Clear Definitions
We define very clearly and specifically what a belief is. We describe exactly and understandably what criteria are, and we clearly explain what a conviction is and how it differs from a belief. We offer a definition of belief not as an absolute truth, but as a tool for effective work.
This approach allowed us to create a methodology for working with beliefs—not just a list of techniques, but a methodology and approach. We used a systematic approach and the almost forgotten principle of fractal organization of NLP space. Now, let’s present the definitions themselves. Consider the following coordinate system:
Each of these concepts can be defined by clear criteria, in particular: a belief is a confirmable connection between two elements of experience, formed by an observer.
Any belief consists of three elements: X, Y, and the observer. The observer is able to establish a certain connection between element X and Y. We can introduce not only cause-and-effect relationships, but also other types of relationships that form beliefs: inclusion, comparison, and so on. Unlike Dilts, we proceed from the NLP presupposition that all relationships are useful—the only question is how they function in the system that includes the observer. This is how we define the basic “molecule” of a belief.
Part of this approach, namely the presence of the observer, was probably implied by Dilts, but he did not introduce it as a necessary element. However, the necessity of this element follows automatically from systems theory. From the structure itself, it is clear that a belief establishes relationships and boundaries not only between elements X and Y, but also defines the relationship of each element to the observer and/or the observer’s relationship to the elements of the belief.
The belief molecule is never alone. Any belief we recognize is always part of a larger belief. The space of beliefs is organized fractally. If we designate the entire belief molecule (including the observer) as element X1, we get element Y1, between which there is some relationship and an observer who is aware of—and from a systems theory perspective, creates—this relationship. Without the figure of the observer, we cannot speak of relationships between elements. Only for the observer do the preceding and subsequent elements of the belief exist. Thus, we get very clear models for working with beliefs, including an easy way to define the concept of a meta-belief.
The S.C.O.R.E. model can also be seen as a consequence of this perspective. Why are changes possible using S.C.O.R.E.? Because the elements are interconnected. Who determines how these elements are connected? Can we establish other relationships within this model, and how will it work? If we understand how a belief is structured, it becomes easy to answer such questions. For example, Peter Wrycza organizes the space of the S.C.O.R.E. model differently, arranging the elements and considering their interactions.
It is possible to achieve amazing results by changing the organization of the observer’s attention to the formed belief, which is essentially what the “Sleight of Mouth” model proposes.
When Dilts claims that only one element should have criteria, this is not entirely accurate. It is possible to have two descriptions of the same order of uncertainty. Gregory Bateson wrote about cause-and-effect relationships established by people: “The pyramids of Cheops are large because they were built by aliens.” If we introduce the observer, there is no rigid connection between cause and effect. It exists only in the mind of the observer. This leads, in particular, to one of the elements of provocative therapy, where we offer a large number of possible causes and say, “Pick any!” We can suggest absurd or ridiculous causes and claim that this is the reason. The same can be done with consequences.
We can assert that both elements must contain criteria by which we recognize these elements, and propose alternatives. From the perspective of the New Code, for example, it would be beneficial to always introduce more elements, demonstrating the conditionality of creating connections and encouraging the construction of deeper links.
Or we can simply ask: “What must a person be convinced of in order to assert this belief?” In this way, we easily obtain a meta-belief and can continue working with it. We can work with element X and the relationship to it. We can enlarge or break down any element of a belief or meta-belief.
The context of a belief can be the belief itself. We can use the values of each element. Reframing is the renaming of element X.
Of course, much of what we propose can also be found in Dilts’ work, but our focus is not on what works and what doesn’t, but on a holistic, criteria-based approach.
Our principles for working with beliefs are aimed at studying how connections are created, at the habit of a person to constantly and continuously establish relationships between elements and to experience emotions about them. This ongoing process in the brain can also be activated by introducing new connections, which is essentially the purpose of “Sleight of Mouth.”
It may be even more interesting to interrupt the pattern itself. However, this article does not yet describe these approaches. We will present them later.