Does the Broken Windows Theory Really Work?
Instead of tackling social inequality and government corruption—goals that often seem unattainable—supporters of the Broken Windows Theory suggest we should “start with ourselves,” such as by painting the entrance of our apartment building. Critics argue that this theory—or rather, hypothesis—is ineffective and does more harm than good.
Origins of the Broken Windows Theory
In 1982, political scientist James Q. Wilson and criminologist George L. Kelling published an article titled “Broken Windows” in The Atlantic Monthly. The authors claimed that general disorder and serious crime are closely linked. Their central thesis: “Social psychologists and police agree that if a broken window in a building is left unrepaired, soon all the windows will be broken.” A broken window signals that nobody cares, and further vandalism—or even more serious crimes—will go unpunished.
They referenced a 1969 experiment by Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo, who left two identical, license-plate-free cars in the Bronx (a poor, predominantly Black neighborhood) and Palo Alto (a wealthy, predominantly white area). In the Bronx, the car was vandalized within ten minutes and completely stripped within a day. In Palo Alto, the car remained untouched for a week until Zimbardo himself smashed it with a sledgehammer. After that, it was destroyed within hours—mainly by respectable white residents.
On a municipal level, a longer-term experiment took place in the mid-1970s when New Jersey introduced foot patrols to foster closer contact between police and residents. After five years, crime rates did not decrease—in fact, they sometimes increased. Still, Wilson and Kelling noted that residents felt safer, arguing that police had successfully curbed minor disorder.
How the Theory Was Implemented
The role of patrol officers was to work with “law-abiding local citizens” to establish rules, often targeting “outsiders.” For example, in one Newark neighborhood, teens were forbidden from making noise, drunks from lying on benches or drinking in public, and vagrants from bothering passersby (which led to immediate detention). If a dispute arose between a local shop worker and a customer, the customer—especially if from another area—was automatically considered at fault.
In these patrolled areas, the population was mostly Black, while the officers were white. Police focused on “suspicious, problematic, or unpredictable people: beggars, drunks, drug addicts, teens, prostitutes, vagrants, and the mentally ill.”
As Roman Lexikov and Daniil Cherny from the Center for the Sociology of Law and Criminology commented, “It takes a lack of intellectual caution to jump from actual broken windows to homeless people on the streets. After all, a beggar on the street and a physically broken window often have very different causes, which should be addressed in different ways.”
Despite these criticisms, the idea quickly gained popularity. “Broken Windows” became one of the most cited articles in criminology and is sometimes called the “Bible of law enforcement,” according to Eric Klinenberg in his book Palaces for the People.
The Illusion of Order: Giuliani and Zero Tolerance
The theory is most closely associated with Rudy Giuliani, elected mayor of New York City in 1993. He expanded the police force by 3,660 officers and introduced a zero-tolerance policy for offenses like graffiti, public drinking, and urinating in public. The city even revived an old cabaret law banning dancing in unauthorized venues.
According to a 2001 study, violent crime in New York dropped by 54% over a decade, which was seen as a victory for the Broken Windows Theory. The approach was also adopted, to varying degrees, in Chicago, Los Angeles, and other U.S. cities.
However, criticism soon followed. Bernard Harcourt’s 2001 book Illusion of Order argued that in 30 years, the theory had never been empirically confirmed; in fact, existing research contradicted it. The theory relies on arbitrarily defined categories of “order” and “disorder,” “law-abiding citizens,” and “offenders.”
Importantly, the drop in New York’s crime rate coincided with a nationwide decline. Harcourt also noted that the decrease matched the end of the crack epidemic. Kristina Sterbenz added that falling unemployment (down 40% in the 1990s) also played a role. Criminologist Ralph Taylor believes that socioeconomic factors are key. In the Bronx, poverty was already high, while in wealthy Palo Alto, Zimbardo had to intervene to provoke vandalism.
Large-Scale Social Experiments
The theory also failed large-scale social tests. In 1994, the U.S. launched the “Moving to Opportunity” program, relocating 4,800 impoverished families to affluent neighborhoods in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Baltimore. Three-quarters of these households were near the poverty line, and two-thirds were African American. According to the theory, their involvement in crime should have decreased in the new environment, but it did not—because their financial situation did not improve, and the move only highlighted the social gap with their neighbors.
The End of Zero Tolerance
In 2014-2015, New York police were forced to scale back aggressive enforcement of minor offenses after mass protests against police violence. Public outrage followed the death of Eric Garner, a Black man who died after police tried to arrest him for selling loose cigarettes. He resisted being handcuffed, and an officer used a chokehold. Despite Garner’s pleas that he couldn’t breathe, the officer continued, resulting in Garner’s death and leaving six children fatherless.
Over the next two years, rates of murder, robbery, rape, and other serious crimes fell by 3-6%, according to a 2017 study. The authors concluded that aggressive policing actually worsens crime rates. “The results are striking. Police tactics aimed at maintaining order only deepen economic and social inequality, destabilize communities, and harm young people’s mental health. Preventive police control can be counterproductive,” wrote study co-author Christopher Sullivan.
Who Are the Targets?
Not only is the Broken Windows Theory largely ineffective, but its main targets are marginalized and vulnerable populations. Harcourt and Ludwig noted that after New York adopted zero tolerance in 1994, administrative arrests for public marijuana use increased 65-fold by 2000, making up 92% of all marijuana-related offenses (including production and distribution). Half of those arrested were Black, and another 30% were Latino. Compared to whites, these arrests more often led to jail time.
Sociologist Mitchell Duneier, in his book Sidewalk, argues that marginalized groups can help maintain order in the city, even if this goes unnoticed. He studied Black street book and magazine vendors, homeless people, and those struggling with addiction. Despite their deviant behavior, they valued the chance to earn money honestly and had their own code of conduct that prevented serious offenses.
In 2004, James Q. Wilson himself admitted, “I still don’t know if fighting disorder reduces crime… God only knows how it really works.” He said the idea was mainly to identify the link between quality of life and violence, but in practice, it led to increased police control and repression of vulnerable groups.
Alternative Approaches to Urban Order
“Most urban crime-reduction strategies still focus on punishment, not improvement,” writes Klinenberg. “We invest too little in local infrastructure like libraries, parks, and community centers that bring people together.”
He cites a positive example from Philadelphia, where the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society has been revitalizing 76 hectares of abandoned lots for years. Overgrown wastelands are turned into public spaces by clearing trash, planting trees, and sowing grass. Early results showed a 39% drop in gun crimes in neighborhoods with restored homes and a 5% decrease around reclaimed lots.