Encyclopedia of Propaganda Techniques: Part 6

Encyclopedia of Propaganda Techniques: Part 6

Preemptive Strike

This technique most often involves the preemptive release of negative information. Its goal is to provoke a reaction from the opponent in advance and in a context that is more favorable for the initiator. Authorities frequently use this method to neutralize criticism of upcoming unpopular decisions. In such cases, officials themselves organize a “random” leak of negative information to stimulate public outrage. The purpose is to “let off steam” among dissatisfied citizens ahead of time. By the time “Day X” arrives, the fire of public anger has already died down. When the actual decision is made, people are too tired to protest and react to the authorities’ actions with indifference.

During elections, a typical example is the preemptive publication of compromising material that is relatively harmless for a particular candidate. This satisfies the electorate’s appetite for “scandal.” The aim is to reduce voters’ interest in such information. Later publications of much more damaging materials, possibly initiated by political opponents, will no longer attract much attention—the voters have already had their fill of “dirt” and no longer react to it.

The Poisonous Sandwich

This propaganda technique actively uses psychological influence through text structuring. It is always preferable not to lie, but to ensure that a person simply does not notice the “unwanted” truth. The communicator delivers a positive message sandwiched between a negative introduction and a negative conclusion. With certain skills and experience, the communicator can make the positive message almost disappear from the audience’s attention.

This is a very effective technique, often used by media outlets that claim to provide “objective coverage of events” and strive to create an image of “just the facts, nothing but the facts.” With this kind of event structuring, objectivity is formally maintained, but the effect of “unwanted” messages is diminished.

The opposite of this is the so-called “Sugar Sandwich,” where a negative message is masked by a positive introduction and a positive conclusion.

The techniques and methods described above are quite simple and very effective. So, we wish you success. But in what, exactly?

References

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